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Abstract  
This study presents an empirical analysis about corporate governance of financial 
institutions in United Arab Emirates (UAE). The purpose of this research is to 
analyze the influence of the structure of board of directors on the performance of 
these institutions. To examine the effect of control exerted by particular families on 
bank management, we estimated models where the dependent variable is return on 
assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE), independent variables are board of 
directors variables, and control variables are bank management variables. Our results 
show that the control of corporate governance by a ruler’s family within a board of 
directors has a positive effect on bank profitability. Our results indicate that control 
by a ruler’s family through a bank’s board of directors compensates for the 
inadequacy of UAE’s corporate governance system. 
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Abstract 
This study presents an empirical analysis about corporate governance of financial 
institutions in United Arab Emirates (UAE). The purpose of this research is to analyze the 
influence of the structure of board of directors on the performance of these institutions. To 
examine the effect of control exerted by particular families on bank management, we 
estimated models where the dependent variable is return on assets (ROA) and return on 
equity (ROE), independent variables are board of director variables, and control variables 
are bank management variables. We consider that boards of directors provide corporate 
governance for UAE banks. Our results show that the control of corporate governance by a 
ruler’s family within a board of directors has a positive effect on bank profitability. Our 
results indicate that control by a ruler’s family through a bank’s board of directors 
compensates for the inadequacy of UAE’s corporate governance system. 
 
Keywords: Board of directors, Bank performance, Corporate governance, GCC banks 
JEL classification: D22, G34 
  
1 Researcher, Middle Eastern Study Group, Area Studies Center, IDE (Jun_Saito@ide.go.jp) 
                                                     
1 Introduction 
 
This study investigates whether bank performance during the recent crisis in United 
Arab Emirates (UAE) was related to their governance structure. We test how the presence 
of ruler or business group family members on the boards of these banks influences bank 
performance. 
The economies in Gulf Arab countries are fundamentally supported by the petroleum 
industry. However, in the long run, it will be difficult to maintain petroleum dependence 
due to declining reserves, rapid population growth, and youth unemployment. Conversely, 
growth of the banking sector has been remarkable in recent years, with a portfolio of 
abundant domestic finance, private funds, and a rich capital base. Moreover, the Gulf 
financial institutions have started to invest to other developing countries. The banking 
sector in Gulf Arab countries is increasing in importance so as to promote economic 
growth in the region and in other developing countries. 
Nevertheless, the management of financial institutions in the Gulf States is not 
transparent. An analysis of financial institutions in the Middle East and North Africa was 
gradually begun in recent years. The research is not more sufficient than the other 
developing countries. 
Corporate governance has become an important issue in Gulf Arab countries in recent 
years. Since the late 2000s, when many Gulf Arab companies began launching overseas 
operations and foreign investment activities, there has been an increasing demand for 
improved transparency of corporate management and discipline.  
Naciri (2011) surveyed corporate governance in the Middle East and North Africa and 
found the system of preparation for corporate governance to be different than in the Gulf 
Arab countries. For example, Kuwait has taken the lead on implementing systems to 
protect small shareholders and their voting rights; however, further improvement of these 
systems is still needed in UAE and Bahrain.  
Improvement in corporate governance promotes sustainable growth of the corporate 
sector and is one of the effective policy challenges to economic growth in developing 
countries. If appropriate management control mechanisms are insufficient, then the 
manager has a priority incentive to self-interest rather than shareholders’ interests. As a 
result, companies will have difficulty with efficient resource allocation, which ultimately 
reduces the profitability of the company. If corporate governance is not conducted properly, 
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then it is difficult for organizations to realize their growth potential. 
To improve corporate governance, boards of directors (“Board/s”) in particular play a 
major role. In general, the function of the Board in a joint stock company is to supervise 
the management team’s behavior and protect the interests of stakeholders, including the 
shareholders. Directors, in principle, are elected at a general meeting of shareholders and 
oversee the management of the company. In the case where a management team decision is 
likely to cause significant losses for the company, the Board has an obligation to report 
this to the shareholders. Proper corporate governance and supervision of management by 
the Board are important factors for company growth. 
However, the effective functioning of corporate governance in Gulf Arab countries 
needs to be evaluated. First, Boards may include a number of ruler families and/or family 
business groups that are also major shareholders. These families play a major role in the 
ownership and supervision of their companies. Halawi and Davidson (2008) 
comprehensively examined the influence of major families on Boards of Gulf Arab 
companies and determined the presence of a corporate “power concentration” among these 
families. Their findings concluded that particular families occupied the majority of Board 
positions in Qatar, Oman, and Abu Dhabi. Although these authors pointed out the strength 
of the influence of particular families on Boards, they did not discuss the effects of this 
“concentrated power” on corporate management. 
Second, we need to consider the fact that the environment surrounding corporate 
management is changing in Gulf Arab countries. The opening of the stock market to 
foreign investors has proceeded gradually in Gulf Arab countries. In principle, foreign 
investors can invest in up to 100 percent of all shares in domestic companies in Saudi 
Arabia and Bahrain, 49 percent in UAE, Kuwait, and Qatar, and 70 percent in Oman. In 
addition, foreign investors have access to direct transactions on the Abu Dhabi and Dubai 
stock exchanges. In 2016, in Saudi Arabia, the direct trading of domestic shares, which 
had been limited to domestic investors and those from Gulf Arab countries, will be opened 
to foreign financial institutions. In addition, financial institutions in the Gulf Arab 
countries have recently appointed foreign directors. Therefore, as the foreign ownership of 
company stocks advances, many questions arise regarding the impact on corporate 
behavior in Gulf Arab countries.  
This study verifies the involvement of family-based power concentrations on Boards 
and the effect on corporate management. We then investigate how changes in Board 
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composition have influenced profitability or performance. 
The rest of the study is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the recent literature on 
corporate governance in the banking industry. In Section 3, we provide background 
information on corporate governance in UAE’s banking sector. We describe the data set 
and the methodology in Section 4. The empirical results are contained in Section 5. 
Section 6 presents some conclusions. 
 
 
2 Literature Review 
 
2.1 Bank management in Gulf Arab countries 
 
This study contributes to research on the influence of changes to executive ability, 
shareholder composition, and market structure in banking management. 
In Gulf Arab countries, government-affiliated financial institutions have the largest 
market share and many global financial institutions have an investment interest in these 
institutions (Kobeissi, 2004). Thus, we need to analyze the effect that executive ability has 
on bank performance (Al-Musalli and Ismail, 2012). 
The entry of foreign banks has an influence on the lending decision of domestic banks 
(DeHaas and Lelyveld, 2006). Gulf Arab banks have entered each other’s markets in recent 
years, but this influence to their markets is hardly analyzed. 
In general, research on financial institutions until the first half of the 2000s focused on 
efficient management (Al-Jarrah and Molyneux, 2005). However, it is more important to 
solve the factors that influence the efficiency of management and the priority of each 
factor. 
 
2.2 Corporate governance and corporate performance 
 
Bhagat and Bolton (2008) comprehensively reviewed the relationship between corporate 
governance and corporate performance. They analyzed the relationship between 
aggregated corporate governance variables and corporate performance variables, including 
return on assets and Tobin’s q, using the Compustat Execucomp database of 1994–2002. 
Their results showed that overall improvement of corporate governance, stock ownership 
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by directors, and the separation of the Chief Executive Officer and Chairman of the Board 
are related to higher corporate performance. Although there are numerous studies on the 
relationship between Board structure and corporate performance, a unified opinion has 
been elusive. For example, with respect to the relationship between the size of the Board 
and corporate performance, Yermack (1996) showed a negative relationship, whereas 
Dalton, et al. (1999) showed a positive relationship. Even without a relationship between 
the structure or Board size and corporate performance, some studies have shown that the 
presence of outside directors improves corporate performance (Fama, 1980, Baysinger and 
Butler, 1985, and Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1990). Meanwhile, Chaganti, et al. (1985) and 
Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) reported that the independence of directors does not 
necessarily improve corporate performance.  
Few studies have analyzed Board composition in Gulf Arab companies (Naciri 2011 and 
Al-Musalli and Ismail 2012). Naciri （2011）  compared the progress of the corporate 
governance environment in the Middle East and North African countries and noted that 
Boards of Gulf Arab countries are occupied by relatives of the controlling shareholders 
and government officials appointed by the major shareholders. Al-Musalli and Ismail 
(2012) examined the relationship between Board characteristics (educational level 
diversity, nationality diversity, board interlocking, board size, and number of independent 
directors) and intellectual capital (IC) performance in a sample of 147 banks in Gulf Arab 
countries for the period 2008 – 2010. The results show that the IC performance of 
GCC-listed banks was low. The number of independent directors has a significant negative 
relationship with the IC performance of GCC-listed banks. All other variables are not 
associated with IC performance. There are not, therefore, many empirical studies on the 
association between Boards and bank performance in Gulf Arab countries. This study 
would fill this gap.  
 
 
3 Corporate Governance in UAE’s Banking Sector 
 
3.1 Corporate governance rules in UAE’s banking sector 
 
 Boards of directors play a crucial role in supervising the behavior of executives and 
protecting the interests of stakeholders, including shareholders in stock corporations. 
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Directors are, in principle elected at a general meeting of shareholders and monitor the 
management of the company. In cases where the management decisions of executives 
might cause significant loss to the company, the Board has a duty to report that fact to its 
shareholders. Sound corporate governance and supervision of management by the Board 
are important factors for corporate growth.  
In UAE, initiatives to improve corporate governance have recently been implemented, 
including specific improvements for the governance of financial institutions. In UAE, 
there are multiple laws and regulations on corporate governance that are duplicated and 
partially covered among industries, Emirates and free zone. Table 1 presents some 
corporate governance rules in UAE. The comprehensive Ministerial Resolution No. (518) 
of 2009 Concerning Governance Rules and Corporate Discipline Standards partly defines 
the duties of Boards and Chairpersons. This ministerial resolution applies to non-financial 
companies in the private sector that are listed on the stock exchange, whereas 
Government-owned companies, listed foreign companies, and financial institutions under 
the supervision of central bank are outside the scope of this rule.  
 
Insert Table 1 
 
To domestic financial institutions, Central Bank has been advising (not necessarily as a 
binding rule) for the conditions of the Board of Directors and management by Central 
Bank Circular: 23/2000 on Required Administrative Structure in Banks. However, that 
guidance is restrictive such as not occupying the post of the Chief Executive Officer by the 
Chairman.  
The next subsection reviews the legal framework related to corporate governance and 
organizes the correlations among the UAE financial institutions from the perspective of 
Board structure.  
 
3.2 Board of directors structure in UAE’s banking sector 
 
Ruler and business group families often play a large role as major shareholders in UAE 
banks (Saito, 2015) and are often also appointed to the Boards of financial institutions. 
Table 2 shows the structure of the Boards for UAE banks from 2000 to 2012. Directors 
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from rulers’ families occupy 13–15% of Board positions. For example, the two largest 
banks, Emirates NBD and National Bank of Abu Dhabi, elect their directors from persons 
of the Maktoum family and Nahyan family, respectively, which are ruler families in Dubai 
and Abu Dhabi. With respect to Emirates NBD, Sheikh Ahmed bin Saeed Al Maktoum 
from the Maktoum family takes office as Chairman of the Board of Directors. It is often 
observed in UAE that a member of a ruler family becomes the Board Chairperson in 
financial institutions. 2  
 
Insert Table 2 
 
Business family members also constitute a large share in Board directorships—almost 
the same as ruler family members. As major shareholders, business families send their 
representatives into Boards to participate actively in the management of the financial 
institution. However, it is not often observed in UAE that any single business group 
possesses the greater part of Boards or that they have strong influence over executive 
officers. The Boards of UAE financial institutions mainly consist of rulers’ family 
members and more than one business family. It is rare that a Board is comprised entirely 
by members of a single family. 3 For example, in Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank’s case, of 
its eleven directors, five are from four business families, al Khouri, al Dhaheri, al Khoory, 
and al Suwaidi.  
The separation of supervision and management are also improved as a part of the actions 
of comprehensive corporate governance in financial institutions. Lately, some financial 
institutions have proactively appointed independent directors who do not hold company 
stock and announce this action in their annual report or website. Many large commercial 
banks such as Emirates NBD and Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank have no provisions for 
independent director appointments. On the other hand, some medium-sized banks such as 
Union National Bank and Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank designate independent directors. The 
2 In the bank sample used in this study, as at the end of 2012, the banks with Chairpersons from 
ruler families are as follows:  Emirates NBD, First Gulf Bank, Dubai Islamic Bank, Union 
National Bank, Emirates Islamic Bank, Noor Islamic Bank, United Arab Bank、National Bank of 
Fujairah, and Ajman Bank. The chairperson of the imperial family is observed in 10 banks out of 
23 commercial banks. 
3 Mashreq Bank, affiliated to the Al Ghurair group, is an exceptional bank. The chairperson is 
Abdullah bin Ahmed Al Ghurair. His son, Abdul Aziz Abdulla al Ghurair, is appointed to CEO. 
His other son, Sultan Abdulla Ahmed Al Ghurair, and his two nephews, Rashid Saif Al Ghurair 
and Abdul Rahman Saif Ahmad Al Ghurair are selected directors. 
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cases where non-executive directors are appointed have been increasing in recent years. 
 
 
4 Methodology and Data 
 
4.1 The model 
 
In this section, we investigate how bank performance is affected by Board of Directors 
structure. Our general model can be summarized as follows:  
 
Performance it = α0＋β1Bank management it＋β2Board of Directors it 
＋β3Financial crisis dummy it＋εit 
 
Where Performance it is the dependent variable for bank performance for bank i in year 
t. Bank management it is the control variable for management variables for bank i in year t. 
Board of Directors it is the independent variable for Board structure variables for bank i in 
year t. Financial crisis dummy it captures the global financial crisis in 2007–2008. εit is 
the disturbance term. 
 
4.2 Bank performance 
 
We use two alternative measures of bank performance. The first is the bank’s return on 
assets (ROA), defined as the bank’s net income divided by total assets. The second 
profitability measure is the bank’s return on equity (ROE), defined as the bank’s net 
income divided by total equity. 
 
4.3 Bank management 
 
 In our regressions, we need to control for various bank management characteristics. The 
first variable is the scale of bank management represented in the amount of net loans （Net 
Loan). The second control variable is the non-interest business ratio or income 
diversification ratio (Security Lending Ratio), defined as the amount of total securities 
divided by the net loan amount. The third variable comprises interest factors. Deposit Rate 
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is defined as total interest expense divided by total customer deposits. Lending Rate is 
defined as gross interest and dividend income divided by total loans to customers. The 
fourth variable represents the soundness of bank management. Tier 1 Capital Ratio is 
defined as total equity divided by total assets. The non-performing loans ratio（NPLs Ratio）
is defined as reserves for impaired loans divided by gross loans.  
 
4.4 Board of directors 
 
Since information regarding Boards of Directors of UAE banks is limited in the 
Bankscope database, we need to access Board data in the annual reports and corporate 
governance reports and the yearbooks of the UAE Banking Federation. Using this 
information, we create the following five variables with regard to Boards of UAE banks. 
The first variable is Number of Directors and the second is for family control of the banks’ 
Boards. Ruler Family Directors Rate is defined as the number of ruler family members 
divided by the total number of Board members. Business Family Directors Rate is defined 
as the number of private business group family members divided by the total number of 
Board members. The third variable is the New Directors Rate, defined as the number of 
newly elected Board members divided by the total number of Board members. Finally, we 
create Remuneration per Director, measured by the total remuneration to directors divided 
by the total number of Board members. 
 
4.5 Data set and summary statistics 
 
 Our main data source is each bank’s annual reports and the Bankscope database. Our 
sample covers the period 2000 through 2012. Using the annual reports and corporate 
governance reports of the UAE banks and the yearbooks of the UAE Banking Federation, 
we obtained information on Board structures and directors’ remuneration for commercial 
banks. Some banks do not release their Board members’ information.  
 Table 3 provides summary statistics for our sample of banks in 2012. It shows that we 
cover almost all commercial banks in UAE. The UAE’s Central Bank reported that the 
number of locally incorporated commercial banks stood at 23 during 2012. The number of 
GCC banks branches in 2012 was six while the number of other foreign banks branches 
was 22. In our research, we focus on UAE bank Board structure and require Board 
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members’ information. Consequently, our study examines only domestic banks and 
excludes foreign banks from the sample. Bank profitability (ROA and ROE) indicated an 
average of 1.3 percent and 8.3 percent, respectively. With regard to changes in the ROA 
and ROE from 2000 to 2012, UAE banks’ profitability was damaged after the global 
financial crisis in 2007 and the Dubai shock in 2009 (Figure 1). At the end of 2012, mean 
total asset value was 69,476 million AED and median total asset value 27,250 million AED. 
As for UAE banks, their fixed assets compared with total assets are not recorded for 2012. 
The proportion of fixed to total assets was only 1.1 percent in 2012. In 2012, on average, 
the security lending ratio was 34.7 percent, the deposit rate was 1.7 percent, and the 
lending rate was 6.5 percent. The Tier 1 Capital Ratio was 15.6 percent and the NPLs ratio 
was 5.9 percent in 2012. In 2012, the average remuneration per director was 2.19 million 
AED (US$595,000).  
 
Insert Table 3 
 
Insert Figure 1 
 
 
5 Empirical Results 
 
Table 4 presents the estimation results from panel data regressions of ROA on bank 
management variables, control variables, and five board of director variables. We estimate 
regressions with both the random and fixed effects models. The regression specification 
reported in Column (1) only includes the set of bank management variables and control 
variables. The regression specification reported in Column (2) adds five Board variables to 
the regressions in Column (1). As a consequence of the Hausman test, the regression 
specifications for Column (1) are selected in the fixed effects model and those in Column 
(2) for the random effects model.  
 
Insert Table 4 
 
As Table 4 shows for both the random (Column 1) and fixed (Column 2) effects models, 
the coefficient of ln(Net Loan) is positively significant. These appear to be positive effects 
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of bank scale on bank performance as ROA. A possible explanation is that large banks are 
well known to be good banks by customers and investors; therefore, large banks could win 
projects with higher returns compared with smaller banks.  
The Security Lending Ratio is negatively significant in regressions (1) in the fixed 
effects model. This result is consistent with Beltratti and Stulz (2012). As argued by 
Beltratti and Stulz (2012), banks with diversified activities derive less of their income 
from interest. In the UAE bank market, non-interest activities, such as securities, are not 
more profitable than interest activities.  
We see that the coefficient on deposit rate is significantly negative in regression (2) in 
the random effects model. High deposit rates increase the interest rate paid to the 
depositors and, therefore, represent a burden on the total cost of the banks. In regression 
(2) in the random effects model, Lending Rate has a positive and highly significant 
relation with ROA. High lending rates contribute to bank profitability. The core business 
of UAE banks in recent years has been lending rather than commission-based; thus, the 
return from lending is an important source of revenue for UAE banks.  
In addition, we find a positive relationship between soundness of bank management 
(Tier 1 Capital Ratio) and bank ROA. The result here is consistent with the empirical 
result of Beltratti and Stulz (2012) and contradicts Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011). We find 
that banks with more Tier 1 capital performed better in terms of ROA. Banks with Tier 1 
capital are considered stable by customers, borrowers, and investors; such banks are likely 
to attract better borrowers and investment projects in the markets.  
The impact of NPLs Ratio on bank performance was not significant in this regression. 
From 2000 to 2012, UAE banks have not suffered from problems related to 
non-performing loans. In 2000, the average ratio of non-performing loan to gross loans 
was 9.2 percent. This rate decreased after 2000. In 2005, the average non-performing loan 
ratio was 4.6 percent, 2.6 % in 2008, 4.4 percent in 2010, and 5.9 percent in 2012. 
The coefficient of the After Shock dummy variable is negative and significant. As shown 
in Figure 1, after the international financial crisis in 2007, the profitability of UAE banks 
was largely damaged, and the impact was felt throughout the range of UAE banks.  
When we analyze the relationship between bank performance and the five Board 
structure variables in Column (2) in the random effects model, we find some Board factors 
affect banks’ ROAs.  
The coefficient of ln(Number of Directors) is not significant. This finding contradicts 
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Aebi et al. (2012) and Beltratti and Stulz (2012). In some studies, Board size is usually 
considered to indicate poor governance (Yermack, 1996). Aebi et al. (2012) concluded that 
Board size may be a less important corporate governance characteristic for banks 
compared with non-banks. Adams and Mehran (2003) and Aebi et al. (2012) indicated that 
the size of banks’ Boards may need to be larger, at least compared with industrial firms, 
due to higher business complexity and related advisory requirements. 
Most importantly, the Ruler Family Directors Rate has a significantly positive relation 
to ROA. As the rulers’ families have more seats on Boards of UAE banks, their 
profitability (ROA) is higher. Thus, monitoring of the bank management by ruler family 
members increases earnings to the management team and, hence, can improve the 
profitability of UAE banks.  
As shown in Table 2, many representatives from business group families become 
members on Boards of UAE banks. However, the estimation results in Table 4 do not 
report their influence on bank performance. 
The variable measuring the rate of new directors to total directors (New Directors Rate) 
is never estimated to be significant in Column (2) in the random effects model. We 
considered that new directors are unfamiliar with monitoring bank management. Some new 
directors might be busier than conventional directors. Thus, the parameter indicating this 
relationship between New Directors Rate and bank performance was expected to be 
negative. However, our regression results show that even if new directors are busy and 
unfamiliar with their new Board obligations, they do not reduce bank profitability. Aebi et 
al. (2012) used a dummy variable for whether a Board is busy (Busy Board) and classified 
a Board as busy if a majority of outside directors hold three or more directorships. If we 
assume the New Directors Rate is a proxy variable of Busy Board, then the findings of no 
relationship between New Directors Rate and bank performance is consistent with the 
findings of Aebi et al. (2012).  
Finally, we find that the coefficient on ln(Remuneration per Director) is positive and 
significant in Column (2) in the random effects model ROA regression. This finding means 
that higher compensation for directors is associated with higher bank earnings. Discipline 
based on incentives for directors may also lead to the expansion of bank revenue in UAE’s 
banking sector.  
 
Insert Table 5 
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 Table 5 shows the panel data regression results for return on equity (ROE). We also 
estimate regressions for ROE with both the random and fixed effects models. The 
regression specifications reported in Column (3) only includes the sets of bank 
management and control variables. The regression specifications reported in Column (4) 
adds five Board variables to the regressions in Column (3). As a consequence of the 
Hausman test, the regression specifications are selected in the fixed and random effects 
models. However, the results of the Hausman test for Model (4) mean the hypothesis that 
“the random effects model is more accurate than the fixed effects model” is correct at 11.9 
percent. Accordingly, when interpreting Model (4), we can also refer to the fixed effects 
model and not only the random effects model. 
First, we will explain the results of the basic model, excluding the variable for the 
Board of Directors. The results for the fixed effects model in Column (3) are similar to the 
results of ROA in Column (1), whereas the estimated results for several variables are 
different from the results of ROA. The coefficient of bank scale (ln(Net Loan)), 
non-interest activities (Security Lending Ratio), and impact of the crisis (After Shock 
dummy), as well as the results of the ROA, are strongly significant. However, the results 
for the fixed effects model in Column (3) find no relationship between soundness of bank 
management (Tier 1 Capital Ratio) and ROE. Soundness of a bank’s management has a 
positive relationship with the profit for assets of stakeholders in general but does not have 
any correlation with the benefit to shareholders' equity. 
In the random effects model in Column (4), the coefficient of Deposit Rate is not 
significant in comparison to the results of ROA in the random effects model in Column (2). 
The coefficient of NPLs Ratio is weakly negative to ROE in the random effects model in 
Column (4). Though significance is not enough, bank management risks, such as 
non-performing loans, have an impact on shareholder equity.  
Second, according to estimation results of the random effects model in Column (4), 
coefficients of both Ruler Family Directors Rate and ln(Remuneration per Director) are 
significantly positive in the estimation results of the random effects model in Column (2). 
However, the results of the fixed effects model in Column (4) report that the coefficient of 
ln(Number of Directors) is weakly positive on ROE, contradicting the results of all other 
estimation models. In the case of UAE banks, the monitoring of bank management by large 
numbers of directors may increase shareholders’ benefit. The coefficient of New Directors 
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Rate in the fixed effects model in Column (4) is significantly negative, whereas the 
coefficient in the random effects model in Column (4) is not significant. Frequent changes 
of directors may harm shareholders’ benefit. 
 
 
6 Conclusions 
 
The purpose of this study is to analyze the influence of Board structure on the 
performance of financial institutions in UAE. Corporate governance initiatives in United 
Arab Emirates have recently been established. Among these initiatives, the most discussed 
aspect has been improvement of governance in financial institutions.  
In the case of UAE commercial banks, the major feature of corporate governance is that 
ruler families and family conglomerates control bank management through the Boards of 
Directors. Rulers’ and business group families often play a large role as major 
shareholders in UAE banks and often they also are appointed to the Boards of Directors. 
As major shareholders, business families send their representatives into Boards to actively 
participate in the management of these financial institutions. 
To examine the effect of Board control by a particular family on bank management, we 
estimated some models where the dependent variable is ROA or ROE, independent 
variables are board of directors variables, and control variables are bank management 
variables. 
Our estimate considers that boards of directors are partially effective in the corporate 
governance of UAE banks. Interestingly, our results show that the control of the bank 
management by rulers’ families has a good effect on bank profitability. Our results 
conclude the possibility that direct control by ruler families through these Boards 
compensates for the inadequacy of UAE’s corporate governance system. 
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Table 1 Corporate governance rules in UAE 
  Dubai   Other Emirates 
  Listed   Non-listed   Listed   Non-listed 
  Financial   Non-financial   Financial   Non-financial   Financial   Non-financial   Financial   Non-financial 
Corporate Governance Code for Small 
and Medium Enterprises (Dubai) 
small and 
medium 
enterprises   
small and 
medium 
enterprises   
small and 
medium 
enterprises   
small and 
medium 
enterprises                 
Ministerial Resolution No. (518) of 
2009 Concerning Governance Rules 
and Corporate Discipline Standards 
  
✔ 
       
✔ 
    
Decision No.(32/R) of 2007 
concerning on Corporate Governance 
Code for Joint Stock Companies and 
Institutional Discipline Criteria 
✔ 
 
✔ 
     
✔ 
 
✔ 
    
Central Bank Circular : 23 /2000 on 
Required Administrative Structure in 
Bank 
✔ 
   
✔ 
   
✔ 
   
✔ 
  
Source:  Authors’ compilation.  
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Table 2 Board of directors structure 
 
Source: Author’s calculation. 
  
Number of Directors
Directors from rulers 
family
Directors from business 
family
Other Direcotrs NewDirectorsRate
2000 7.0 14.1% 26.7% 59.2% 5.6%
2001 8.3 13.0% 28.6% 58.4% 23.4%
2002 8.1 13.2% 27.8% 59.0% 11.0%
2003 8.3 13.2% 28.4% 58.4% 7.6%
2004 8.2 13.4% 28.6% 58.0% 11.1%
2005 8.2 13.4% 26.5% 60.1% 12.2%
2006 8.4 12.0% 27.8% 60.2% 14.4%
2007 8.3 12.6% 28.0% 59.4% 19.2%
2008 8.7 13.2% 29.2% 57.6% 7.4%
2009 8.3 13.9% 27.8% 58.3% 10.3%
2010 7.3 15.0% 29.5% 55.5% 6.8%
2011 8.0 15.1% 28.5% 56.4% 18.2%
2012 7.7 15.1% 31.4% 53.5% 8.9%
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Figure 1 Bank performance from 2000 to 2012 
 
Source: Bankscope database. 
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Table 3 Sample summary statistics for 2012 
Variable 
Number of 
Banks Average Maximum Minimum Median 
Standard 
deviation 
ROA 23 0.013 0.051 -0.092 0.016 0.024 
ROE 23 0.083 0.246 -0.584 0.113 0.151 
Total Asset 23 69,476 308,296 5,490 27,250 87,148 
Fixed Asset 23 743 2,469 48 626 662 
Security Lending Ratio 23 0.347 4.926 0.017 0.126 0.979 
Deposit Rate 21 0.017 0.033 0.006 0.016 0.007 
Lending Rate 23 0.065 0.126 0.037 0.061 0.020 
Tier 1 Capital Ratio 23 0.156 0.279 0.070 0.150 0.054 
NPLs Ratio 23 0.059 0.132 0.013 0.057 0.032 
Remuneration Per Director 11 2.186 11.860 0.489 0.700 3.280 
Source: Bankscope database. 
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Table 4 Return on assets (ROA) and Board of Directors structure 
Dependent variable ROA 
  (1)   (2) 
  Random Effect Fixed Effect   Random Effect Fixed Effect 
Constant   -0.038 **   -0.074 ***     -0.045 ***   -0.028   
  ( 0.010 ) ( 0.000 )   ( 0.009 ) ( 0.379 ) 
ln(Net Loan)   0.005 ***   0.008 ***     0.004 **   0.002   
  ( 0.000 ) ( 0.000 )   ( 0.014 ) ( 0.431 ) 
Security Lending Ratio   -0.016 ***   -0.019 ***     0.012     0.002   
  ( 0.000 ) ( 0.000 )   ( 0.267 ) ( 0.870 ) 
Deposit Rate   -0.133 *   -0.096       -0.227 **   -0.182   
  ( 0.073 ) ( 0.262 )   ( 0.018 ) ( 0.158 ) 
Lending Rate   0.084 *   0.047       0.292 ***   0.198 ** 
  ( 0.055 ) ( 0.371 )   ( 0.000 ) ( 0.027 ) 
Tier 1 Capital Ratio   0.127 ***   0.171 ***     0.128 ***   0.131 *** 
  ( 0.000 ) ( 0.000 )   ( 0.000 ) ( 0.000 ) 
NPLs Ratio   -0.057 ***   -0.037       -0.042     -0.023   
  ( 0.009 ) ( 0.129 )   ( 0.166 ) ( 0.544 ) 
After Shock dummy   -0.012 ***   -0.015 ***     -0.012 ***   -0.013 *** 
  ( 0.000 ) ( 0.000 )   ( 0.000 ) ( 0.002 ) 
ln(Number of Directors)                 0.004     0.006   
                ( 0.176 ) ( 0.278 ) 
Ruler Family Directors Rate                 0.015 **   -0.002   
                ( 0.029 ) ( 0.914 ) 
Business Family Directors Rate                 -0.005     -0.003   
                ( 0.274 ) ( 0.818 ) 
New Directors Rate                 -0.008     -0.007   
                ( 0.105 ) ( 0.190 ) 
ln(Remuneration per Director)                 0.003 **   0.005 ** 
                ( 0.016 ) ( 0.023 ) 
Number of observations   179     179       111     111   
Hausman test   Chi-square(7)  = 23.912        Chi-square(12)  = 14.279   
        ( 0.001  )         ( 0.283 ) 
* Signifiant at the 10% level                           
** Significant at the 5 % level                           
*** Significant at the 1 % level                           
p-value is in parentheses                           
Source: Author’s calculation. 
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Table 5 Return on equity (ROE) and Board of Directors structure 
Dependent variable ROE 
  (3)   (4) 
  Random Effect Fixed Effect   Random Effect Fixed Effect 
Constant   -0.188 **   -0.345 ***     -0.143     -0.076   
  ( 0.029 ) ( 0.003 )   ( 0.182 ) ( 0.675 ) 
ln(Net Loan)   0.037 ***   0.054 ***     0.026 ***   0.017   
  ( 0.000 ) ( 0.000 )   ( 0.006 ) ( 0.309 ) 
Security Lending Ratio   -0.103 ***   -0.117 ***     0.016     -0.005   
  ( 0.000 ) ( 0.000 )   ( 0.810 ) ( 0.951 ) 
Deposit Rate   -0.558     -0.499       -0.705     -0.239   
  ( 0.193 ) ( 0.313 )   ( 0.218 ) ( 0.741 ) 
Lending Rate   0.327     0.256       1.175 ***   0.722   
  ( 0.197 ) ( 0.403 )   ( 0.003 ) ( 0.149 ) 
Tier 1 Capital Ratio   0.140     0.212       0.001     -0.001   
  ( 0.238 ) ( 0.172 )   ( 0.993 ) ( 0.995 ) 
NPLs Ratio   -0.314 **   -0.228       -0.314 *   -0.180   
  ( 0.013 ) ( 0.104 )   ( 0.086 ) ( 0.405 ) 
After Shock dummy   -0.081 ***   -0.099 ***     -0.076 ***   -0.078 *** 
  ( 0.000 ) ( 0.000 )   ( 0.000 ) ( 0.001 ) 
ln(Number of Directors)                 0.015     0.054 * 
                ( 0.406 ) ( 0.083 ) 
Ruler Family Directors Rate                 0.129 ***   0.002   
                ( 0.008 ) ( 0.986 ) 
Business Family Directors Rate                 -0.015     -0.050   
                ( 0.587 ) ( 0.419 ) 
New Directors Rate                 -0.043     -0.054 * 
                ( 0.119 ) ( 0.075 ) 
ln(Remuneration per Director)                 0.014 **   0.031 ** 
                ( 0.047 ) ( 0.013 ) 
Number of observations   179     179       111     111   
Hausman test   Chi-square(7)  = 14.856        Chi-square(12)  = 17.908   
        ( 0.038  )         ( 0.119 ) 
* Signifiant at the 10% level                           
** Significant at the 5 % level                           
*** Significant at the 1 % level                           
p-value is in parentheses                           
Source: Author’s calculation. 
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